What it does The majority held that the Secretary reasonably determined that Claude presented a covered supply-chain risk, that less intrusive measures were not reasonably available, and that an urgent national-security interest justified immediate action. It construed 41 U.S.C. § 4713 broadly: a “supply chain risk” can arise when a supplier’s model training, contractual restrictions, or other controls may manipulate a product’s function or deny its use, even without hostile intent or bad motive. The court also held that the Department’s post-exclusion notice and opportunity to respond cured any prejudice from the lack of advance process.

Who it affects The decision directly affects Anthropic, the Department and its contractors, including Palantir, which used Claude in work for the Department. It also bears on agencies’ ability to exclude information-technology suppliers whose products may not perform as officials require in national-security operations, including where restrictions concern lethal autonomous warfare or mass surveillance.

Why it matters This is a significant federal-court interpretation of the Supply Chain Security Act in the context of frontier AI. The court deferred to executive national-security judgments and rejected Anthropic’s statutory, due-process, and First Amendment challenges. It also confirmed that the D.C. Circuit has jurisdiction over section 4713 procurement actions and that other judicial review is barred by the statute.

Key dates and numbers

• March 3, 2026: Secretary Hegseth issued the exclusion determination; notice was emailed March 4.
• March 9, 2026: Anthropic petitioned for review; the statute provides a 60-day filing period.
• March 19, 2026: The Department supplied supporting materials and reopened a 30-day response period.
• June 3, 2026: The Secretary denied reconsideration; the petitions were later consolidated.
• September 25, 2026: The court decided the consolidated case, No. 26-1049 with No. 26-1162.