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    <title>NatSec Noir</title>
    <link>https://natsecnoir.com/</link>
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    <description>A reading file of primary US national-security regulation: FCC, Team Telecom, BIS, litigation. Every record links its source.</description>
    <language>en</language>
    <item>
      <title>Anthropic v Hegseth DC Cir Opinion</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-27-26-1049-2194984-ede67c/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-27-26-1049-2194984-ede67c/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 25 Sep 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The D.C. Circuit upheld the Department of War’s exclusion of Anthropic and its Claude AI products from the Department’s supply chain under the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act of 2018.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The majority held that the Secretary reasonably determined that Claude presented a covered supply-chain risk, that less intrusive measures were not reasonably available, and that an urgent national-security interest justified immediate action. It construed 41 U.S.C. § 4713 broadly: a “supply chain risk” can arise when a supplier’s model training, contractual restrictions, or other controls may manipulate a product’s function or deny its use, even without hostile intent or bad motive. The court also held that the Department’s post-exclusion notice and opportunity to respond cured any prejudice from the lack of advance process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The decision directly affects Anthropic, the Department and its contractors, including Palantir, which used Claude in work for the Department. It also bears on agencies’ ability to exclude information-technology suppliers whose products may not perform as officials require in national-security operations, including where restrictions concern lethal autonomous warfare or mass surveillance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; This is a significant federal-court interpretation of the Supply Chain Security Act in the context of frontier AI. The court deferred to executive national-security judgments and rejected Anthropic’s statutory, due-process, and First Amendment challenges. It also confirmed that the D.C. Circuit has jurisdiction over section 4713 procurement actions and that other judicial review is barred by the statute.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 3, 2026: Secretary Hegseth issued the exclusion determination; notice was emailed March 4.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 9, 2026: Anthropic petitioned for review; the statute provides a 60-day filing period.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 19, 2026: The Department supplied supporting materials and reopened a 30-day response period.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;June 3, 2026: The Secretary denied reconsideration; the petitions were later consolidated.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;September 25, 2026: The court decided the consolidated case, No. 26-1049 with No. 26-1162.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Conditional Approval - ANSCER Robotics</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-18-da-26-996a1-3919ef/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-18-da-26-996a1-3919ef/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau announces that the Department of War’s Conditional Approval requires exclusion of ANSCER Robotics’ AR250, AR650, and AR1250 robotic platforms from the FCC Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The notice updates the Covered List and the companion list of conditionally approved devices. It concludes that DoW made the required “specific determination” that the identified robotic devices do not pose unacceptable risks to U.S. national security, so the FCC must exclude them from the category of foreign-produced advanced robotic devices added on July 28, 2026. The exemption is conditional on ANSCER’s continuous compliance with its onshoring plan and updated product vetting. False statements, misrepresentations, or failure to comply may terminate the approval and return the devices to the Covered List. The notice includes revised appendices listing covered equipment and conditional approvals.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly affects ANSCER Robotics, its AR250, AR650, and AR1250 platforms, DoW, and FCC personnel, test labs, telecommunications certification bodies (TCBs), and equipment-authorization applicants that must apply the updated list. It also provides context for existing Covered List entries and prior conditional approvals for UAS and routers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; This notice demonstrates how an executive-branch national-security determination can create a device-specific exception to the FCC’s supply-chain restrictions while preserving ongoing compliance and vetting conditions. It also clarifies that the Covered List is continuously maintained rather than static.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;September 18, 2026: release date and effective update date.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;July 28, 2026: advanced robotic devices were added to the Covered List.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;September 18, 2026: ANSCER’s Conditional Approval date.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Devices covered: AR250, AR650, and AR1250 robotic platforms.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Authorities cited: 47 U.S.C. § 1601 and 47 CFR §§ 1.50002(a), 1.50003.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Doe v GitHub and OpenAI (9th Cir 2026)</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-22-24-7700-9ab099/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-22-24-7700-9ab099/</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Digital Millennium Copyright Act claim, holding that AI-generated code output alleged as similar to or derived from existing code does not, without more, show that copyright management information was removed or altered from a copy of an existing protected work.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The opinion addresses an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). It holds that the programmers plausibly alleged Article III standing because their complaint described a substantial risk that Copilot would reproduce their code without attribution. On the merits, however, the court concluded that Copilot and Codex generate new works through a probabilistic process rather than retrieve stored copies and strip their copyright management information. The court declined to consider the plaintiffs’ separate “input” theory because it was forfeited. It explained that “identicality” is not an independent statutory element, although substantial reproduction with missing attribution may support an inference of removal.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The decision directly affects the pseudonymous programmers and GitHub, Microsoft, and OpenAI, and provides guidance for DMCA claims involving generative AI coding tools and open-source licenses. It does not resolve the plaintiffs’ two contract claims, which remained pending in the district court, or decide ordinary copyright infringement.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The ruling limits the use of DMCA § 1202(b) to transform allegations that an AI system generates similar or derivative code without attribution into claims for removal or alteration of copyright management information. It distinguishes those allegations from copying an existing work whose attached attribution information was affirmatively removed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Filed September 16, 2026; argued February 11, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Ninth Circuit No. 24-7700; ND Cal. district court No. 4:22-cv-06823-JST.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant provisions: 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b), § 1202(c), and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;GitHub’s duplicate-detection feature identifies verbatim public-code snippets of 150 characters or more.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Derycom Citation - Failure to Submit Truthful information</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-12-record-58b8c9/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-12-record-58b8c9/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC issued a Citation to Derycom Certification Services, Inc., finding that the company apparently misrepresented its U.S. presence and certified radiofrequency devices beyond its authorized technical scope.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; This Citation provides notice under section 503(b)(5) of the Communications Act that Derycom must comply with section 1.17 and Part 2, Subpart J of the FCC’s rules. The Commission states that Derycom represented that it operated from a Minnesota address, while acknowledging that most of its personnel and its 99%-owner were in China, and that it listed Joseph Tousignant as a technical reviewer despite his statement that he performed no technical work for the company. The FCC also finds that Derycom certified at least ten devices requiring testing above its approved 40 GHz limit, including devices requiring testing up to 100, 200, and 220 GHz.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The Citation directly affects Derycom and its future dealings with the FCC as a telecommunications certification body (TCB). It also bears on FCC-recognized TCBs, NIST designation, laboratory accreditation, and manufacturers relying on TCB certifications.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The action emphasizes that truthful ownership, location, staffing, accreditation, and scope information is central to the integrity of the equipment-authorization system. Continued violations could lead to substantial forfeitures, equipment seizure, or criminal sanctions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Adopted and released September 11, 2026; response due within 30 calendar days.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Derycom’s FCC recognition expired June 30, 2026, after suspension in May.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Derycom was authorized only through 40 GHz but certified at least 10 devices above that scope.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Conditional Approvals: Asus, Comtrend (Routers), Husqvarna (robots)</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-10-da-26-957a1-172966/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-10-da-26-957a1-172966/</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau announces that specified ASUS and Comtrend routers and Husqvarna robotic platforms are exempt from the FCC Covered List because the Department of War granted them Conditional Approvals.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice updates the Covered List and its accompanying Conditional Approvals appendix. It removes from the practical scope of the Covered List ASUS Computer International’s listed RT, ROG, ROG Strix, TUF Gaming, ExpertWiFi, ZenWiFi, 5G MiFi, repeater, and wireless-access-point product lines; Comtrend Corporation’s GRG-4366u, VG-8043u, PBL-6201, and NL-3131 routers; and Husqvarna AB’s 305v IQ, 310v IQ, 420v IQ, and 440v IQ robotic platforms. The Bureau finds each approval is a “specific determination” that the devices do not pose the relevant U.S. national-security risks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The update affects the named manufacturers, distributors, equipment authorization applicants, test labs, and telecommunications users dealing with the identified devices. It also provides staff guidance for TCBs, test labs, and applicants concerning the revised list.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice illustrates how Executive Branch Conditional Approvals can create exceptions to broad Covered List categories for foreign-produced routers and advanced robotic devices, while preserving the FCC’s obligation to maintain and update the list.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released September 9, 2026; DA 26-957.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Covered List categories for foreign-produced routers and advanced robotic devices were added March 23 and July 28, 2026, respectively.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The ASUS and Comtrend approvals terminate March 6, 2028; the Husqvarna approval is listed without a termination date in the notice.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Paramount LOA Execution Version</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-19-tt-26-006-paramount-loa-execution-version-def69e/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-19-tt-26-006-paramount-loa-execution-version-def69e/</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Sep 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Letter of Agreement (LOA) establishes Paramount Global’s binding national-security and law-enforcement mitigation commitments in connection with its request for FCC approval of foreign ownership above Section 310(b)(4)’s 25% benchmarks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The LOA requires Paramount to notify the Department of Justice compliance-monitoring agencies within two calendar days after the closing of the merger between Paramount Skydance and Warner Bros. Discovery. Within 90 days after closing, Paramount must submit post-closing policies and plans for safeguarding U.S. person data; the agencies have 60 days to object or not object. Paramount must prevent unauthorized access, use, and disclosure of that data, update its safeguards as appropriate, and obtain prior FCC approval for changes to foreign investors’ voting, governance, or information rights. The agreement becomes effective for compliance purposes upon FCC approval of the petition.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The commitments bind Paramount and its successors and assigns, cover its subsidiaries, affiliates, and service providers, and apply to the specified foreign investors. DOJ, including the FBI, serves as the compliance-monitoring agency, with the Committee retaining administrative and termination authorities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The LOA conditions the proposed foreign investment and data-security arrangements on continuing oversight. Breaches or unresolved national-security concerns may prompt recommendations that the FCC modify, condition, revoke, cancel, or nullify relevant authorizations and may support other legal remedies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;September 4, 2026: LOA date shown in the document; catalogue date is September 3, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;2 days: closing notification deadline.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;90 days: deadline for submitting security policies and plans.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;60 days: agency objection/non-objection period.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;25%: Section 310(b)(4) foreign-equity and voting benchmark addressed by the petition.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;20%: proposed advance ceiling for certain non-controlling prospective foreign investors.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;TT 26-006&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Cogito NAL - $25K fine proposed against foreign drone maker</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-17-record-d5f306/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-17-record-d5f306/</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC imposes a $25,000 monetary forfeiture on Cogito Tech Company Limited for willfully or repeatedly failing to respond to an Enforcement Bureau Letter of Inquiry concerning possible U.S. marketing of radiofrequency equipment on the Covered List, specifically foreign-produced drones (UAS or UAS critical components).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;See also &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.fcc.gov/document/eb-fines-7-companies-failing-respond-investigative-requests&quot;&gt;https://www.fcc.gov/document/eb-fines-7-companies-failing-respond-investigative-requests&lt;/a&gt;
finalizing forfeitures for substantially similar &amp;quot;failure to respond&amp;quot; violations against: Cogito Tech; Fikaxo Technology; Lyno Dynamics; Skyhigh Tech; Spatial Hover Inc.; SZ Knowact Robot; WaveGo Tech.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Forfeiture Order adopts and makes final the tentative findings and conclusions in the Bureau’s July 10, 2026 Notice of Apparent Liability, and orders Cogito to pay $25,000 under section 503(b) of the Communications Act and the FCC’s forfeiture rules. Payment is due within 30 calendar days after release, with payment and notification procedures specified through CORES, credit card, ACH, or wire transfer. The order states that nonpayment may lead to referral to the Department of Justice for enforcement.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The order directly affects Cogito, which did not respond to the LOI or file a response to the NAL. It also concerns Cogito’s U.S. agents for service of process, David Wu of United Consulting Technology Services Co., Ltd. and Alan Graham of Vishtec LLC, and the FCC offices responsible for enforcement and payment administration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The decision uses a failure to provide information as the basis for a penalty in a Covered List-related inquiry. The FCC explains that nonresponse undermines its ability to protect U.S. consumers and mitigate national-security risks associated with certain entities marketing RF equipment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;December 22, 2025: RF equipment referenced as added to the Covered List.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;July 10, 2026: NAL issued; Cogito was proposed for a $25,000 forfeiture.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;August 31, 2026: Forfeiture Order adopted and released.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;$25,000: Final monetary forfeiture.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;30 calendar days: Payment period after release.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Hytera and ZTE Notice of Apparent Liability</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-16-record-92731a/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-16-record-92731a/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 28 Aug 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC proposes a $188,491 forfeiture against each of Hytera Communications Corporation Limited and ZTE Corporation and orders each company to publicly update its Covered List affiliate disclosures after finding apparent willful and repeated violations of 47 CFR § 2.903(d).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The item finds that the companies’ March 8, 2023 filings did not fully identify subsidiaries and affiliates producing covered communications equipment, and that neither company subsequently filed required public updates. Hytera disclosed 60 additional entities in its 2025 response to a Commission letter of inquiry, 49 of which staff identified as potentially producing covered equipment. ZTE disclosed 15 additional entities, including 13 currently active entities, and staff identified 11 as potentially producing covered equipment. The FCC requires each company to file updated names and contact information for all covered-producing associated entities within 30 calendar days of the item’s release and to pay or contest the proposed forfeiture within the same period.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The order directly affects Hytera and ZTE, their disclosed subsidiaries and affiliates, equipment-authorization applicants, Telecommunications Certification Bodies, and other stakeholders relying on accurate Covered List information.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The FCC treats the disclosure obligation as continuing until cured and links transparent affiliation information to enforcement of the Secure Networks Act and Secure Equipment Act. The proposed penalty is the statutory maximum for each company, not a final forfeiture order.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Adopted August 27, 2026; released August 28, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Initial disclosure deadline: March 8, 2023; updates generally due within 30 days of changes or Covered List updates.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Proposed forfeiture: $188,491 for each company; base forfeiture: $3,000 per day.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Hytera: 3 entities initially filed; 49 additional entities identified by staff.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;ZTE: 1 entity initially filed; 11 additional entities identified by staff.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Hesai v DoD</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-07-25-5256-2188737-5c12a6/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-07-25-5256-2188737-5c12a6/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The D.C. Circuit reversed summary judgment for the Secretary of Defense and remanded Hesai’s challenge to its Section 1260H designation, holding that due process required notice of the unclassified materials supporting the designation and a meaningful opportunity to respond before finalization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The court held that Hesai’s listing as a “Chinese military company” implicated a protected liberty interest under the stigma-plus doctrine because publication caused reputational harm and federal law automatically excluded listed companies from specified government contracts and forms of financial assistance. The Secretary’s October 2024 redesignation provided neither the required pre-deprivation notice nor an opportunity to rebut the unclassified record. National-security interests did not justify postponing process absent a particularized showing, and the procedural violation was not harmless. The court did not reach Hesai’s Administrative Procedure Act claims and remanded for further proceedings without vacating the 2024 designation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The ruling directly affects Hesai Technology Co., Ltd., Hesai, Inc., the Department of Defense, and future Section 1260H designation proceedings. It also concerns federal agencies and listed companies subject to statutory procurement and funding restrictions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The opinion constitutionalizes procedural safeguards for Section 1260H designations, requiring meaningful pre-finalization notice and response opportunities unless the government specifically justifies postponement. A later list including Hesai did not moot the challenge because the earlier designation could retain reputational effects and the process failure could recur.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;January 31, 2024: initial designation.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;October 15, 2024: rescission and redesignation.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;June 10, 2026: new Section 1260H list again included Hesai.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;August 18, 2026: opinion decided; No. 25-5256.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Section 1260H: annual Chinese military company listing authority.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>DJI v. DoD</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-07-25-5367-2026-08-14-3acc86/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-07-25-5367-2026-08-14-3acc86/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 14 Aug 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The D.C. Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded DJI’s challenge to its designation as a Chinese military company under Section 1260H, holding that most of DJI’s claims failed but that the district court could not uphold the Secretary of Defense’s separate finding that DJI contributes to China’s defense industrial base without examining the agency’s stated, classified rationale.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The court held that DJI’s challenge was not moot despite a newer 2026 designation. It rejected DJI’s due-process claim because the company did not show the designation broadly precluded its chosen business, upheld substantial-evidence support for the finding that DJI knowingly received Chinese government assistance through military-industrial planning efforts, and rejected the claim that the Secretary had to explain why other companies were not listed. It vacated the contribution-related portion of the judgment and remanded for the district court to review the classified record, while applying the Chenery rule against post hoc agency rationales.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The decision directly affects DJI and the Department of Defense, and provides guidance for entities listed under the Section 1260H Chinese military company regime. Inclusion can restrict federal contracting and certain Department of Energy benefits and cause reputational harm.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The opinion confirms deferential review of evidentiary inferences supporting 1260H designations but requires courts to evaluate the agency’s actual rationale for a determination, including classified material where authorized, rather than supply explanations from litigation briefing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Section 1260H was enacted in 2021 and amended in 2024.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;DJI was listed in October 2022, January 2024, January 2025, and June 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The court decided the appeal on August 14, 2026, after argument on February 6, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Appeal No. 25-5367 was remanded for further proceedings.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Stranger Pings: Chinese Telecom Companies Infiltrate US Infrastructure</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-12-f655c442-2d93-45ea-8cab-9d58a3a04052-68a524/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-12-f655c442-2d93-45ea-8cab-9d58a3a04052-68a524/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 04 Aug 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The report concludes that FCC denials and revocations of the three PRC state-controlled carriers’ Section 214 authority did not remove their U.S. infrastructure, network relationships, or parent-controlled routing access, leaving a distinct national-security risk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; It presents findings from congressional document requests, subpoenas, sworn interviews, routing records, federal records, and network scans concerning China Telecom (Americas), China Mobile International (USA), and China Unicom (Americas). It describes parent direction of U.S. subsidiaries; retained points of presence, colocation, equipment, interconnection, and IP-transit arrangements; Chinese-manufactured hardware; trusted routing identities; and China Unicom’s acceptable-use terms. It also examines BGP incidents and case studies involving Qihoo 360, CloudRadium, and Integrity Technology Group. The report recommends legislation expanding FCC, Team Telecom, and Commerce ICTS authority, entity-specific Covered List determinations, targeted removal or mitigation, routing-security measures, and interim logging.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The findings concern the three carriers and their PRC or Hong Kong parents, U.S. telecommunications and internet-infrastructure operators, enterprise customers, and federal agencies responsible for communications and national security.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The report identifies a gap between licensing remedies and control of physical and logical internet infrastructure. It argues that retained U.S. assets and parent-linked routing can preserve access, obscure activity, and expose American traffic even after Section 214 action.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;FCC Section 214 actions occurred from 2019 through 2022.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The investigation began March 5, 2025; subpoenas issued April 23, 2025.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The report identifies 108,891 high-confidence BGP hijack events affecting at least 477 U.S. networks from January 2018 through May 2025.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;It documents 10 CTA points of presence, 39 CMI USA entries across 27 facilities, and up to 1,380 Gbps of CMI USA capacity.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Robotics and Power Inverters Covered List</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-robotics-and-power-inverters-covered-list-d605d1/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-robotics-and-power-inverters-covered-list-d605d1/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau adds foreign-produced power inverters and advanced robotic devices to the FCC Covered List based on Executive Branch national-security determinations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice updates the Covered List to include “Foreign-produced power inverters,” except devices granted a Conditional Approval by the Department of War (DoW) or Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and “Foreign-produced advanced robotic devices,” except devices granted a DoW Conditional Approval. It adopts the determinations’ definitions and explains that foreign production, rather than identification of a particular entity, defines these new categories. It also describes submission and evaluation processes for Conditional Approvals.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; Foreign producers, importers, equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and telecommunications and infrastructure businesses using covered equipment are affected. Covered equipment is prohibited from receiving FCC equipment authorization, and applicants must certify that equipment is not covered. The notice states that the new category-based entries do not trigger rules applying to entities identified on the Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The action extends the Covered List beyond named companies to power-grid equipment and networked robotic systems. The cited risks include lack of secure U.S. supply chain, supply-chain disruption, cybersecurity vulnerabilities, remote manipulation, surveillance, data exfiltration, and threats to critical infrastructure and U.S. persons. The notice also republishes the broader updated list, including prior telecommunications, surveillance, cybersecurity, UAS, and router entries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released and Covered List updated: July 28, 2026 (the catalogue date is recorded as July 28, 2028).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;National Security Determinations transmitted to the FCC: July 27, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;New entries: foreign-produced power inverters and advanced robotic devices.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant rules: 47 CFR §§ 1.50002, 1.50003, 2.903(a), and 2.911(d)(5)(i).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OET Permissive Change Waiver - Robotics Power Inverters</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-oet-permissive-change-waiver-robotics-power-inve-773dde/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-oet-permissive-change-waiver-robotics-power-inve-773dde/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Office of Engineering and Technology waives, through at least January 1, 2029, specified prohibitions on Class I and Class II permissive changes for previously authorized covered foreign-produced advanced robotic devices and power inverters.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; OET waives the prohibitions in 47 CFR §§ 2.932(b) and 2.1043(b) for software and firmware updates that mitigate harm to U.S. consumers, including updates that patch vulnerabilities, preserve device functionality, or facilitate compatibility with different operating systems. The relief applies only to devices authorized before the July 28, 2026 additions to the Covered List, and covers both Class I and Class II permissive changes. Grantees must continue to comply with other applicable FCC requirements, including Class II information and testing rules, performance requirements, marketing restrictions, and certification obligations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The waiver affects authorized foreign-produced advanced robotic devices and power inverters newly designated as covered equipment. It does not authorize new equipment or eliminate other FCC compliance duties. The power-inverter category excludes devices granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS; the advanced-robotic-device category excludes devices granted a Conditional Approval by DoW.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; Without the waiver, the Covered List additions could prevent already-authorized devices from receiving security and functionality updates. OET found that special circumstances and the public interest justify temporary relief to support continued safe operation and mitigate risks to U.S. consumers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released July 28, 2026; DA 26-789.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;ET Docket No. 21-232.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Covered List additions and waiver effective July 28, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relief extends at least until January 1, 2029.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Rules addressed: 47 CFR §§ 2.932(b) and 2.1043(b).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Conditional Approvals - SpaceX (routers)</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-e558e5/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-e558e5/</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 27 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau announces that Department of War Conditional Approval exempts SpaceX Services, Inc.’s Starlink routers from the FCC Covered List, subject to a February 1, 2028 termination date.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice explains that the Commission added foreign-produced routers to the Covered List on March 23, 2026, while excluding routers granted Conditional Approval by the Department of War or Department of Homeland Security. It determines that the Department of War approval is a “specific determination” that the identified devices do not pose unacceptable risks and updates the Covered List and Conditional Approvals appendix accordingly. The notice also republishes the current Covered List and identifies other router approvals.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly affects SpaceX’s Starlink routers and entities that manufacture, test, authorize, deploy, or procure foreign-produced routers. The appended approval table identifies products from Netgear, Adtran, eero, Calix, Nokia, Sagemcom, Miri, Arcadyan, Hitron, and other manufacturers with specified approval periods.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice clarifies how executive-branch Conditional Approvals change the scope of the FCC’s supply-chain restrictions and preserves staff guidance for test labs, Telecommunications Certification Bodies, and equipment-authorization applicants.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released July 27, 2026; DA 26-775.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Router category added to the Covered List March 23, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Starlink Conditional Approval: July 27, 2026–February 1, 2028.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Governing rules: 47 CFR §§ 1.50002(a), 1.50003.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Conditional Approvals - Exedy, Parallel Flight (drones), Calix, Sagemcom, Humax, Askey (routers)</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-router-conditional-approvals-b741bf/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-router-conditional-approvals-b741bf/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau excludes specified uncrewed aircraft systems and router classes from the Covered List because the Department of War granted Conditional Approvals for those devices.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; PSHSB updates the Covered List and its accompanying Conditional Approvals appendix under 47 CFR §§ 1.50002(a) and 1.50003. The newly approved equipment includes Exedy Globalparts Corporation’s Ayre CX UAS, Parallel Flight Technologies’ Firefly UAS, Calix’s GigaSpire class routers and Giga Pro, Sagemcom’s “FAST” Broadband Class of Gateways and Routers, Humax’s HNR2306 and HNRM30 routers, and Askey’s ASK-NCM300 and ASK-NCQ8000 Wi-Fi 8 Gateways. The notice also republishes the broader Covered List as of July 24, 2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The exclusions affect the named manufacturers and their specified products, as well as equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and telecommunications equipment businesses that rely on the Covered List. Exemptions remain conditional; for UAS, continued effectiveness depends on compliance with an approved onshoring plan and updated product vetting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice illustrates how Executive Branch national-security determinations and Conditional Approvals modify the FCC’s supply-chain restrictions without removing the underlying categories of foreign-produced UAS, UAS components, or routers from the Covered List. A Conditional Approval may end, and a device may return to the list, if required conditions are violated or the government finds false statements or misrepresentations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released July 24, 2026; DA 26-768.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Covered List proceedings: WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, and EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Newly listed router approvals terminate November 22, 2027 for Calix, December 5, 2027 for Sagemcom, and January 17, 2028 for Humax and Askey.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Covered List exemptions for Blue UAS and qualifying domestic end products run until January 1, 2028.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EA Security 3.0</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-07-record-b3934b/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-07-record-b3934b/</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC adopts new equipment-authorization and marketing restrictions to address national-security risks in the communications supply chain, while seeking comment on additional Covered List and equipment-authorization measures.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Third Report and Order prohibits authorization of devices containing qualifying logic-bearing hardware components produced by Covered List entities when the finished device would itself be prohibited if produced by that entity. It defines such components using a digital-device framework, including a threshold above 9,000 pulses (cycles) per second, but does not extend the new prohibition to software or firmware. The order also requires full certification—not Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity—for modifications or permissive changes made by Covered List entities, clarifies the treatment of previously authorized equipment, revises the definition of “critical infrastructure,” and treats specified online-marketplace activities as marketing. Marketplaces must verify and prominently display the correct FCC ID for covered certified-device listings at the online point of sale, subject to stated exemptions and grandfathering rules.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; Device manufacturers, applicants, Covered List entities, telecommunications certification bodies, retailers, resellers, e-commerce marketplaces, and third-party sellers are directly affected. Previously authorized equipment and qualifying applications pending before the new component restriction takes effect receive limited protection.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The order closes a component-level pathway through which a Covered List entity’s hardware could enter an otherwise authorized device. It also shifts compliance responsibility upstream and toward online sales platforms, linking authorization, supply-chain provenance, and consumer-facing transparency.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Adopted July 22, 2026; released July 23, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Logic-bearing-component restriction becomes effective 30 days after Federal Register publication.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The accompanying Third Further Notice sets comment and reply-comment deadlines at 30 and 45 days after Federal Register publication.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;ET Docket No. 21-232; FCC-26-50.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Shenzhen STS -CopyPaste-2 Order to Show Cause</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-shenzhen-sts-copypaste-2-order-to-show-cause-e823b0/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-shenzhen-sts-copypaste-2-order-to-show-cause-e823b0/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Office of Engineering and Technology institutes a proceeding to withdraw Shenzhen STS Test Services Co. Ltd.’s recognition as an accredited test laboratory based on its tentative determination that the laboratory willfully submitted false or inaccurate equipment test results.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; OET identifies repeated identical test data in reports submitted for wholly different products and tentatively finds at least 40 incorrect or falsified reports. It concludes that the conduct may violate Section 302(e) of the Communications Act and FCC rules requiring accurate test-data attestations and prohibiting materially incorrect or misleading information. The Order directs Shenzhen STS to show cause why its laboratory recognition should not be withdrawn.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The proceeding directly affects Shenzhen STS, a Shenzhen, China laboratory recognized by the FCC in 2017 and accredited by the American Association for Laboratory Accreditation. It also bears on equipment applicants whose authorization filings relied on the laboratory’s reports, including filings associated with numerous smartphones, tablets, headsets, earbuds, diagnostic devices, modules, and other products.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The action tests the integrity of the FCC equipment-authorization system and the reliability of third-party laboratory certifications. Withdrawal of recognition could prevent Shenzhen STS from continuing to serve as an FCC-recognized test laboratory, but the Order is preliminary and provides an opportunity to respond.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Adopted and released July 21, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Response due within 35 calendar days after release.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;OET states that approximately 4,100 applications used Shenzhen STS reports; its search cited 4,134 results.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The Order identifies at least 40 potentially incorrect or falsified reports and lists FCC IDs in 20 groupings.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Odyssey Robot Order to Show Cause</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-odyssey-robot-order-to-show-cause-9abf1e/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-odyssey-robot-order-to-show-cause-9abf1e/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) and Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) initiate a proceeding requiring Odyssey Robot LLC to show cause why the Commission should not revoke two equipment authorizations that the bureaus tentatively find were obtained through false representations concerning Covered List equipment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Order to Show Cause concerns FCC ID 2BSYT-FMAWZOD, an uncrewed aircraft system (UAS), and FCC ID 2BSYT-YMAWZOD, its remote controller. OET and PSHSB tentatively determine that both devices are Covered UAS or UAS critical components produced in a foreign country and therefore were improperly authorized. The order alleges that Odyssey certified the equipment was not prohibited covered equipment and submitted supporting materials representing that the devices were developed, designed, and manufactured in California and assembled by eTak in Texas. eTak later denied any relationship with Odyssey or any assembly work. The order proceeds under section 2.939(d) of the FCC rules.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly affects Odyssey and its two equipment authorizations. It also addresses eTak’s role in Odyssey’s representations and follows FCC inquiries into Odyssey’s business structure, manufacturing, affiliations, and compliance practices. The order gives Odyssey notice and an opportunity to respond; it does not itself make a final revocation determination.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The proceeding illustrates the FCC’s enforcement of prohibitions on authorizing Covered List equipment and its reliance on applicant attestations. Failure to respond, or failure to provide a reasonable basis against revocation, may result in cancellation of the authorizations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Adopted and released July 21, 2026; DA 26-746.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;ET Docket No. 26-186.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Odyssey received certification grants on March 24, 2026, and April 20, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Odyssey must file a written response within 10 calendar days of release.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The FCC’s Covered List addition for foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components was made December 22, 2025.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Bartz v Anthropic (ND Cal July 20, 2026) - Final Settlement Approval,</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-27-0-a0c820/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-27-0-a0c820/</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Northern District of California grants final approval to the class-action settlement resolving copyright claims against Anthropic arising from its downloading of books from LibGen and PiLiMi, enters judgment, and dismisses the action with prejudice.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The order certifies and approves the settlement class, approves the notice, claims process, plan of allocation and distribution, releases, and settlement administration. It authorizes distribution from a non-reversionary $1.5 billion fund, with pro rata per-work payments to eligible copyright owners, and preserves claims concerning works outside the Works List, AI outputs, and future conduct. Anthropic must destroy original files downloaded from Library Genesis or Pirate Library Mirror and copies originating from them, subject to legal-preservation obligations. The court awards Class Counsel $101,561,111 in fees, $2,635,197.46 in expenses, an $18.22 million cost reserve, and $15,000 to each of the three class representatives.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The order binds copyright owners of eligible works on the Works List, Anthropic, the named representatives, class counsel, the Settlement Administrator, and the Special Master. It allows late opt-outs by Esquivel and Castells but disallows other late requests, including Donald S. Passman’s.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The ruling provides finality for claims concerning the listed works while expressly retaining claims involving excluded works, AI outputs, and future misconduct. It also illustrates judicial scrutiny of megafund fees by using a lodestar multiplier rather than the requested percentage method.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Settlement fund: $1.5 billion; approximately $3,000 per claimed work.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Works List: 482,460 works; 440,490 claimed as of April 16, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Opt-out deadline: February 9, 2026; final order dated July 20, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Fee award: $101,561,111, based on a 3.75 multiplier; 10% withheld pending post-distribution accounting.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Conditional Approvals - Gryphon, Sercomm (routers)</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-8cede6/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-8cede6/</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PSHSB announces that two routers received Department of War Conditional Approval and therefore are exempt from the FCC Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice updates the Covered List and the associated Conditional Approvals appendix to exclude Gryphon Safety Online, Inc.’s Parental Control WiFi Router and Sercomm Corporation’s Air4992 Wi-Fi 7 Router. PSHSB finds that each approval is a “specific determination” that the device does not pose risks to U.S. national security, and says the Commission is required to update the list accordingly. The notice also republishes the broader Covered List and identifies the devices’ approval periods.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly affects Gryphon and Sercomm and entities that manufacture, test, authorize, purchase, or use the identified routers. It also provides guidance for telecommunications certification bodies, test laboratories, and equipment-authorization applicants. The notice concerns the Covered List regime for routers produced in foreign countries, while preserving the general list’s other covered equipment and services.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice demonstrates how Executive Branch Conditional Approvals modify the scope of the FCC Covered List without removing the general router category. It clarifies that qualifying devices are exempt only through the applicable approval and highlights the Commission’s duty to maintain and monitor the list under its rules.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released July 20, 2026; DA 26-756.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Routers were added to the Covered List on March 23, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Both Conditional Approvals run through January 10, 2028.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant proceedings: WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, and EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PN Seeking Comment on Marketing Import Limit Drone Clones</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-pn-seeking-comment-on-marketing-import-limit-dro-7ae191/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-pn-seeking-comment-on-marketing-import-limit-dro-7ae191/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and Office of Engineering and Technology propose limiting existing equipment authorizations to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of specified covered UAS, UAS critical components, and section 1709 communications and video-surveillance equipment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The notice seeks comment on applying 47 CFR § 2.939(e) to equipment produced by Cogito, Fikaxo, Lyno Dynamics, Skyhigh Tech, Spatial Hover, SZ Knowact, WaveGo, Xtra, and XAG. It identifies covered devices and FCC ID ranges, while tentatively concluding that the equipment presents national-security risks and that the prohibitions serve the public interest. The proposal would not revoke underlying authorizations or bar continued operation of already-purchased equipment. It would also exclude federal-government use, commercial testing and product development, and equipment exempted from the Covered List through the Blue UAS Cleared List, Buy American treatment, or Conditional Approval.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The proposal directly affects the named manufacturers and their affiliates, importers, distributors, retailers, marketers, equipment users, and other interested parties. Existing owners could continue using covered devices, but affected commercial supply-chain participants would need to stop importation and marketing if the proposal is adopted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice extends the FCC’s post-authorization Covered List framework to equipment added in 2025, emphasizing risks involving unauthorized surveillance, data exfiltration, and supply-chain vulnerabilities. It also invites evidence on economic and supply-chain effects and on whether trusted domestic alternatives can replace the identified products.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released July 17, 2026; comments are due 30 days after Federal Register publication.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Proposed cessation of importation and marketing: 30 days after Federal Register publication.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Covers equipment associated with nine named entities, including XAG FCC IDs beginning with 2A46G, and specified FCC IDs for the other entities.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The proceeding is PS Docket No. 26-184 and DA 26-742.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Conditional Approvals - Gemtek (routers)</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-e64105/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-e64105/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau announces that the Department of War granted Conditional Approval for Gemtek Technology Co., Ltd.’s WRTQ-411BE and WNRFQQ-113BE routers, requiring their exclusion from the FCC Covered List through the approval period.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice explains that foreign-produced routers were added to the Covered List on March 23, 2026, subject to an exception for routers receiving Conditional Approval from the Department of War or Department of Homeland Security. PSHSB determines that the DoW approval is a “specific determination” that the identified devices do not pose unacceptable risks and updates the Covered List accordingly. Appendices provide the July 10, 2026 Covered List and the broader list of equipment with Conditional Approvals.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The immediate action benefits Gemtek and users, test labs, certification bodies, and equipment-authorization applicants dealing with the two named router models. The notice also records existing conditional approvals for routers from companies including Netgear, Adtran, eero, Calix, Nokia, Alpha Networks, Sagemcom, Miri, Arcadyan, Hitron, and Vantiva. Covered List entities, affiliates, and subsidiaries remain subject to applicable FCC restrictions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice illustrates how executive-branch national-security determinations can modify the scope of the FCC Covered List without eliminating the general foreign-router category. It also makes approval periods central to compliance: the Gemtek exemption is time-limited, and FCC staff will provide guidance on the update.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;July 10, 2026: release date and Covered List update.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 23, 2026: foreign-produced routers added to the Covered List.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;January 3, 2028: Gemtek Conditional Approval termination date.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;DA 26-704; WC Docket No. 18-89; ET Docket No. 21-232; EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;47 CFR §§ 1.50002(a), 1.50003: provisions cited for maintaining and updating the Covered List.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Conditional Approvals - Vantiva (routers)</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-a0069d/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-a0069d/</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau announces that the Department of War conditionally approved Vantiva USA, LLC’s CWA438TX router and therefore exempts that device from the FCC Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice updates the Covered List and its accompanying Conditional Approvals appendix to reflect the approval. PSHSB determines that the approval is a “specific determination” that the device does not pose a risk to U.S. national security, requiring the Bureau to exclude it from the list. The notice also publishes the current Covered List and identifies prior conditional approvals for routers and uncrewed aircraft systems.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly affects Vantiva USA, LLC and the CWA438TX router. It also informs equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and telecommunications certification bodies about the effect of the update. Other manufacturers and devices listed in Appendix B remain subject to their stated conditional-approval periods.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice illustrates how a device otherwise covered by the March 2026 foreign-produced-router designation can be removed from the Covered List following an Executive Branch conditional approval. Covered List status affects FCC authorizations and related supply-chain restrictions; the exemption is time-limited.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released July 8, 2026; DA 26-688.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Vantiva CWA438TX approval runs July 8, 2026, through January 3, 2028.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Foreign-produced routers were added to the Covered List on March 23, 2026, subject to specified exceptions.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant proceedings: WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, and EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Order Denying DigitalSystem 214</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-order-denying-digitalsystem-214-dc828a/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-order-denying-digitalsystem-214-dc828a/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC denies Digitalsystem Technology Inc.’s application for global facilities-based and global resale international section 214 authority because the record shows substantial national-security and law-enforcement risks that cannot be mitigated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Memorandum Opinion and Order concludes that Digitalsystem is subject to the jurisdiction and control of the government of China through Hui Xie, a Chinese citizen who owns 70% of the company and holds majority control. It also finds that Digitalsystem’s Hong Kong affiliate and other actual or potential relationships, planned handling of U.S. customer records, cybersecurity practices, and lawful-intercept capabilities create exploitable vulnerabilities. The Commission relies on the totality of the unclassified record, including the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Services Sector’s recommendation; classified evidence provides additional support but is not necessary to the decision.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The decision directly affects Digitalsystem, its owners and proposed international telecommunications operations. It also reflects the Committee’s role in reviewing foreign-owned or foreign-controlled telecommunications applications under the Executive Branch foreign-participation process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The order emphasizes that mitigation depends on a baseline of trust, candor, and transparency. Digitalsystem’s conflicting or incomplete responses, combined with China-related jurisdictional and operational risks, led the FCC to find that it could not rely on the company to comply with or report violations of mitigation terms.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Application filed March 26, 2024; Committee recommendation filed April 2, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Order adopted June 30, 2026, and released July 7, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Section 214 file: ITC-214-20240326-00054; FCC number: FCC 26-44.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Petitions for reconsideration may be filed within 30 days of release.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Digitalsystem added to Covered List</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-digitalsystem-added-to-covered-list-b04176/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-digitalsystem-added-to-covered-list-b04176/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau adds Digitalsystem Technology Inc.’s section 214 international telecommunications services to the FCC Covered List based on a national-security determination by the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Services Sector.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice finds that the Committee’s recommendation to deny Digitalsystem’s international section 214 authorization application constitutes a specific determination under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act that the covered services pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security or the security and safety of U.S. persons. It updates the Covered List to include “International telecommunications services provided by Digitalsystem Technology Inc., subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934.” The inclusion extends to Digitalsystem subsidiaries and affiliates, and the updated list and Committee recommendation are attached.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly affects Digitalsystem and its subsidiaries and affiliates providing the specified international telecommunications services. It also concerns the FCC and the Committee, whose members are the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and War, as well as providers and applicants subject to the FCC’s Covered List and section 214 authorization regime.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice links Covered List placement to the Executive Branch’s Team Telecom review process. The Committee cited potential exploitation by PRC- and Hong Kong-based threat actors, risks associated with Digitalsystem’s planned offerings and relationships, and infeasible mitigation measures. The FCC previously denied the application after allowing Digitalsystem an opportunity to respond.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released: July 7, 2026; DA 26-673.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Committee recommendation received by the FCC: April 3, 2026; the attached recommendation is dated April 1, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Application file: ITC-214-20240326-00054.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant authorities: section 2 of the Secure Networks Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1601, and 47 CFR §§ 1.50002(a) and 1.50003.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Related FCC application decision: FCC 26-44, issued July 7, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Pre-2024 Covered List Marketing Import Limitation</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-pre-2024-covered-list-marketing-import-limitatio-85e98f/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-pre-2024-covered-list-marketing-import-limitatio-85e98f/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and Office of Engineering and Technology prohibit the continued importation and marketing of previously authorized covered communications equipment added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier, while preserving existing users’ ability to operate equipment they already possess.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; This Public Notice applies the authorization-limitation framework established in the Equipment Authorization Security Second Report and Order to equipment authorized before the FCC’s 2022 rules and later placed on the Covered List. The prohibition excludes equipment added after 2024, including specified 2025 and 2026 additions. For use-based Covered List entries, the restriction applies only to covered uses; physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure is temporarily exempted until the FCC adopts a definition and guidance for “critical infrastructure.” Statutory and regulatory exceptions, including specified government marketing and importation circumstances, remain available.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; Importers, marketers, authorization holders, distributors, and sellers of covered equipment are affected. Existing owners may continue using and operating legally purchased equipment. The action particularly concerns equipment associated with entities identified through congressional or national-security determinations, including Hikvision, Hytera, and equipment incorporating Kaspersky software.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The FCC concludes that national-security risks outweigh economic and supply-chain concerns, rejecting requests for longer transition periods, phased implementation, replacement exemptions, or reimbursement. It states that the prohibition is intended to prevent continued deployment and market flooding of equipment previously determined to pose unacceptable risks, without revoking underlying authorizations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released June 26, 2026; effective 10 days after Federal Register publication.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Covers equipment added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The March 27, 2026 comment Public Notice provided at least 30 days for public comment.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Equipment added to the initial 2021 listing has not received authorization since November 11, 2022.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The critical-infrastructure-use suspension ends when the FCC adopts a definition and interpretive guidance.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Submarine Cable 2nd Report and Order and 2nd Further Notice</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-10-record-bc9ec0/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-10-record-bc9ec0/</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC requires entities that own or operate submarine line terminal equipment (SLTE) on submarine cables landing in the United States to hold a cable landing license, while adopting additional security requirements and a faster review pathway.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Second Report and Order creates a blanket cable landing license for current and future SLTE owners and operators that are not already licensed and do not fall within specified presumptive disqualifications. It imposes routine conditions, including compliance, annual circuit-capacity reporting, and cybersecurity and physical-security risk-management plans. The rules prohibit covered or foreign-adversary-controlled principal equipment and certain service providers, extend restrictions on IRU and capacity-leasing arrangements involving Covered List entities, and require ownership, foreign-adversary, Covered List, location, renewal, and retirement notifications. Applications meeting ten national-security standards are presumptively exempt from referral to Executive Branch agencies. The accompanying Second Further Notice seeks comment on additional routine conditions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The rules apply to cable landing licensees, SLTE owners and operators, customers and downstream users of capacity, and providers involved in submarine cable operations. Entities subject to the foreign-adversary or character presumptive disqualifying conditions are excluded from the blanket license for new SLTE operations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The FCC treats SLTE as a core component that connects submarine fibers to terrestrial networks and can control traffic, capacity, or spectrum. The framework closes what the Commission describes as an oversight gap while attempting to accelerate trusted submarine-cable deployment and protect critical communications infrastructure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Adopted June 25, 2026; released June 30, 2026 (FCC 26-42).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Comments are due 30 days after Federal Register publication; replies are due 60 days after publication.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The FCC received 12 comments, 7 replies, and 22 ex partes in the preceding proceeding.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The ten national-security standards support presumptive exemption from Executive Branch referral.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Conditional Approvals - Real-Time Robotics and Ceres Air (drones), Hitron (routers)</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-router-conditional-approvals-812a40/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-router-conditional-approvals-812a40/</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) updates the Covered List to exclude specified uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS), UAS critical components, and routers that received Department of War (DoW) Conditional Approvals.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; PSHSB finds that the DoW approvals are “a specific determination” that the identified devices do not pose unacceptable risks to U.S. national security or the safety and security of U.S. persons. It therefore updates the Covered List and publishes an accompanying inventory of approved devices. The June 22 approvals cover Real-Time Robotics’ HERA platform, Ceres Air’s C40, C31, C26, C20, and C6 platforms, and Hitron’s listed gateways, routers, and hotspots. The appendices also consolidate earlier approvals for additional UAS and router products.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The exclusions affect manufacturers and suppliers of the approved devices, equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and telecommunications providers evaluating covered equipment. The notice identifies approvals for companies including SiFly, Netgear, Adtran, eero, Nokia, Arcadyan, Sagemcom, and Flock Safety, among others.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The action clarifies how DoW or Department of Homeland Security Conditional Approvals operate as exceptions to broad Covered List categories for foreign-produced UAS and routers. It preserves the Covered List framework while allowing approved products to proceed outside those exclusions, subject to approval end dates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released June 22, 2026 (DA 26-616).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;HERA and Ceres approvals terminate December 31, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Hitron approvals terminate December 18, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant proceedings: WC Docket No. 18-89; ET Docket No. 21-232; EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Covered List Toy Drones Removal</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-covered-list-toy-drones-removal-f177b2/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-covered-list-toy-drones-removal-f177b2/</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau removes foreign-produced “Toy Drones” and “Toy Drones that contain foreign-produced components” from the FCC Covered List based on a Department of War determination that they do not pose an unacceptable national-security or U.S.-person safety risk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The notice updates the Covered List under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act and FCC rules §§ 1.50002(a) and 1.50003. The exemption applies only to devices meeting every criterion in the appended determination:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A device is considered a Toy Drone only if it meets all of the below criteria:
• Maximum Take-off Weight is equal to or less than 150 grams;
• Operation is limited to line-of-sight operations equal to or less than 100 meters;
• Maximum sustained altitude must be equal to or less than 300 feet;
• No GPS/GNSS or equivalent system (e.g., no return-to-home, waypoint missions, or subject tracking);
• No connectivity or network capability (e.g., no connection to Internet, mobile apps, cellular networks, Wi-Fi), but may include a dedicated radio-frequency link between controller and drone, typically on 2.4 GHz or 5.8 GHz bands;
o Radio frequences and WiFi Channels may not be modifiable or programmable and must conform to FCC regulatory requirements;
• No imaging or sensing capabilities (e.g., no photo/video camera, microphones, live video feed, onboard recording, or sensors capable of surveillance or data gathering on the toy);
• Flight time must be equal to or less than 10 minutes;
• Maximum horizontal speed must be equal to or less than 10 meters/second;
• Explicitly marketed as a toy for recreational use;
• No modular payload interface, such as airdrop and release mechanisms, searchlights and strobes, and micro-FPV cameras and protection cages;
• Does not contain brushless motors; and
• Is not produced by an entity identified in Section 1709 of the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The change affects foreign-produced toy-drone manufacturers, importers, equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and Telecommunications Certification Bodies. It does not remove the broader foreign-produced UAS and UAS-critical-component category or other Covered List entries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice creates a narrowly defined exclusion from the UAS Covered List while preserving the broader restriction on foreign-produced UAS. The determination remains effective unless superseded, and FCC staff will provide implementation guidance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;June 12, 2026: DoW determination received by PSHSB.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;June 15, 2026: notice released and Covered List updated.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;December 22, 2025: foreign-produced UAS category originally added.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;January 1, 2027: existing Blue UAS and domestic-end-product exceptions remain scheduled to last until this date.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Conditional Approvals - Flock Group (drones), Miri Technologies (routers)</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-router-conditional-approvals-887b5e/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-router-conditional-approvals-887b5e/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau announces that specified uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS), UAS critical components, and routers covered by Department of War Conditional Approvals are exempt from the FCC Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; PSHSB updates the Covered List and publishes an accompanying list of Conditional Approvals. The notice recognizes DoW determinations that the identified devices do not pose unacceptable risks to U.S. national security or the safety and security of U.S. persons. Newly identified approvals include Flock Group, Inc.’s Flock Alpha UAS and Miri Technologies, Inc.’s Miri X10 Travel router. Appendix B also lists earlier approvals for additional UAS and routers, with specified expiration dates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action affects manufacturers and users of foreign-produced UAS, UAS critical components, and routers, as well as equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and telecommunications certification bodies. Covered List restrictions continue to apply to devices outside the listed exemptions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice illustrates how agency-specific national-security determinations can narrow the scope of broad Covered List categories without removing those categories altogether. Conditional exemptions are time-limited and must be reflected in the FCC’s maintained list, creating ongoing compliance and authorization implications.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released June 12, 2026, as DA 26-584.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant proceedings: WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, and EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Flock Alpha approval runs through December 31, 2026;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Miri X10 approval runs through December 12, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The Covered List’s foreign-produced UAS category and router category retain their broader exclusions for devices with DoW or DHS Conditional Approval.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Conditional Approvals  ABZ Innovation Kft. (drone) and Arcadyan (routers)</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-router-conditional-approvals-2nd-c9e7be/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-router-conditional-approvals-2nd-c9e7be/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau updates the Covered List to exempt specified foreign-produced uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS), UAS critical components, and routers covered by Department of War Conditional Approvals.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice finds that the Department of War’s Conditional Approvals are “a specific determination” that the identified devices do not pose unacceptable risks to U.S. national security, and therefore removes those devices from the Covered List. The appendices provide the June 12, 2026 Covered List and the current Conditional Approvals, including approvals for ABZ Innovation Kft.’s L50 UAS and Arcadyan Technology Corporation routers, plus previously approved devices from other manufacturers. The Bureau also notes that FCC staff will provide guidance to TCBs, test labs, and equipment-authorization applicants.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly affects manufacturers and suppliers of foreign-produced UAS, UAS critical components, and routers, as well as entities seeking FCC equipment authorizations. It identifies exemptions for devices from ABZ Innovation, Arcadyan, Miri Technologies, Flock Safety, Netgear, Adtran, eero, Calix, Nokia, Sagemcom, Blueflite, and Innovation First, among others listed in Appendix B.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice clarifies how Executive Branch national-security determinations and device-specific Conditional Approvals modify the scope of the FCC Covered List. Covered-list treatment remains category-based for foreign-produced UAS and routers, but approved devices are excluded for the stated approval periods.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released June 12, 2026; DA 26-585.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;ABZ L50 approval terminates December 31, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Arcadyan router approval terminates December 12, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant proceedings: WC Docket No. 18-89; ET Docket No. 21-232; EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>20260161958 OpenAI SafetyPatent</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-28-20260161958-openai-deliberate-alignment-patent-a3f64c/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-28-20260161958-openai-deliberate-alignment-patent-a3f64c/</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The patent application discloses methods for training and operating language models that reason over learned policies to choose compliant responses, refusals, or modified completions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The application describes synthetic generation of &lt;code&gt;(prompt, chain-of-thought, response)&lt;/code&gt; tuples using prompts and policy text, evaluation and filtering by a policy-aware reward model, supervised fine-tuning, and subsequent reinforcement learning. The resulting reasoning-capable model may apply policy principles during inference without receiving the policy text in the prompt. For a given request, it can provide a direct answer, refuse while citing the policy, or produce a policy-compliant completion that withholds disallowed material while remaining helpful. The disclosure also describes moderation, governance, evaluation, and machine-learning system components.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The disclosed technology primarily concerns OpenAI OpCo, LLC and developers or operators of generative AI systems, including users interacting through conversational interfaces and APIs. It is framed for safety and compliance policies covering areas such as illicit behavior, self-harm, harassment or hate speech, extremism, defamation, personal data, regulated advice, copyright, sexual content, and political interference.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The application presents policy-aware reasoning as an alternative or supplement to external runtime safety checks. It claims potential gains in policy adherence, robustness to adversarial prompts, interpretability, data efficiency, latency, and training efficiency, while emphasizing that internal reasoning may remain hidden from users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Published June 11, 2026, as US 2026/0161958 A1.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Application No. 19/379,423; filed November 4, 2025.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Claims priority to provisional application No. 63/730,823, filed December 11, 2024.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The disclosure identifies three principal inference outcomes: response, refusal, or policy-compliant completion.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Embodiment 12 claims a training pipeline combining tuple evaluation and filtering, supervised fine-tuning, and reinforcement learning.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SLG-CPC - Copy-Paste Lab #1- Instituting Order</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-14-record-ef1517/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-14-record-ef1517/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC institutes a proceeding to withdraw SLG-CPC Test Laboratory Co., Ltd.’s recognition as an accredited test laboratory based on OET’s tentative determination that the laboratory willfully submitted false or inaccurate equipment-test results.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; OET finds that SLG-CPC reused identical test data in reports for wholly different products and tentatively identifies 33 incorrect or falsified test reports across 14 groupings of FCC IDs. The Order alleges violations of the certification requirement in 47 CFR § 2.911(e) and the truthfulness requirements in 47 CFR § 1.17. It directs SLG-CPC to show why its FCC recognition should not be withdrawn and requires a written response, in English with supporting business documents, translations, and sworn declarations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The proceeding directly affects SLG-CPC, a China-based laboratory recognized by the FCC in 2021 and accredited by the American Association for Laboratory Accreditation. It also bears on applicants whose equipment-authorization submissions relied on SLG-CPC reports, including applications associated with the FCC IDs listed in the Order.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; Recognition as an FCC test laboratory depends on competence, integrity, trustworthiness, and accurate technical data. The proceeding illustrates the FCC’s enforcement of laboratory-certification rules and may lead to withdrawal of SLG-CPC’s authority to support equipment-authorization applications.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Adopted and released: June 9, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Response deadline: 35 calendar days after release.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;OET requested an explanation on March 27, 2026; SLG-CPC responded on April 15, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The laboratory had submitted reports supporting approximately 300 equipment-authorization applications; OET identified 33 incorrect or falsified reports.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Conditional Approvals - Innovation First VEX AIR (drone) and Sagemcom (routers)</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-router-conditional-approvals-8829e8/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-router-conditional-approvals-8829e8/</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) updates the FCC Covered List to exclude devices covered by Department of War (DoW) Conditional Approvals, including Innovation First International’s VEX AIR uncrewed aircraft system and Sagemcom USA’s specified routers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; PSHSB finds that each Conditional Approval is a “specific determination” that the identified equipment does not pose unacceptable risks to U.S. national security or the safety and security of U.S. persons. It therefore updates the Covered List and publishes revised Covered List and Conditional Approvals appendices. The notice explains that foreign-produced UAS, UAS critical components, and routers generally remain covered unless an applicable exception or Conditional Approval applies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly concerns producers and users of the listed UAS, UAS components, and routers, including Innovation First International, Sagemcom USA, and the companies identified in Appendix B. It also provides guidance context for telecommunications certification bodies, test laboratories, and equipment-authorization applicants.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice shows how executive-branch device-specific determinations alter the scope of the FCC’s supply-chain restrictions without removing the broader categories of foreign-produced UAS or routers from the Covered List. Conditional exclusions are time-limited and remain reflected in the FCC’s published lists.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released June 4, 2026; DA 26-548.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Dockets: WC 18-89, ET 21-232, and EA 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;VEX AIR approval runs through December 31, 2026; Sagemcom approvals run through December 5, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The notice identifies the Covered List as updated June 4, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Conditional Approvals - Calix, Alpha Networks (routers)</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-2f4276/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-2f4276/</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau announces that specified foreign-produced routers have received Department of War Conditional Approvals and are therefore exempt from the FCC Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice updates the Covered List and its accompanying Conditional Approvals materials after DoW reviewed submissions and determined that Calix’s 7p6, 7u6m.2, 7u4txg, and 7u4 broadband routers, and Alpha Networks Inc. USA’s 1700 and 2700 series routers, do not pose unacceptable risks to U.S. national security. The approvals expire November 22, 2027. PSHSB states that each approval is “a specific determination” supporting exclusion of the identified equipment and publishes updated appendices.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly affects Calix and Alpha Networks, manufacturers and suppliers of the identified routers, equipment authorization applicants, test labs, and telecommunications providers evaluating whether covered equipment may be authorized or deployed. It also provides guidance for TCBs and other stakeholders applying the updated Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice illustrates how Executive Branch Conditional Approvals modify the scope of the FCC Covered List. Foreign-produced routers remain covered unless granted approval by DoW or DHS, while approved devices are excluded subject to the approval terms and expiration dates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released June 1, 2026; DA 26-542.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Router category added to the Covered List March 23, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Conditional Approvals for the Calix and Alpha Networks routers terminate November 22, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant proceedings: WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, and EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Conditional Approvals - Blueflite, Verity AG, Air VEV (drones)</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-conditional-approvals-3aa5ad/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-drone-conditional-approvals-3aa5ad/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) updates the Covered List to exempt UAS and UAS critical components receiving Department of War (DoW) Conditional Approvals, while publishing the current Covered List and related approval lists.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; PSHSB treats each DoW Conditional Approval as a “specific determination” that the covered device does not pose unacceptable risks to U.S. national security and U.S. persons, and therefore removes those devices from the Covered List. The notice confirms approvals for Blueflite’s Cobalt 461 and related components, Verity AG’s Series 4 Indoor Autonomous Inventory System, and Air VEV’s 120C and 060C systems. Its updated appendices also identify previously approved UAS and router products, including devices from SiFly, Mobilicom, ScoutDI, Verge, &lt;a href=&quot;http://Sees.ai&quot;&gt;Sees.ai&lt;/a&gt;, Air6 System, Elevon Aerial, Netgear, Adtran, eero, Calix, and Nokia.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action affects manufacturers, importers, equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and Telecommunications Certification Bodies dealing with foreign-produced UAS, UAS critical components, or routers subject to the Covered List. It also provides guidance context for FCC staff reviewing authorization-related questions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice demonstrates that the Covered List is dynamic: foreign-produced UAS and covered routers remain generally listed, but specific DoW or Department of Homeland Security determinations create product-level exemptions. The exemptions permit the identified equipment to fall outside the Covered List during the stated approval periods.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released May 26, 2026; DA 26-524.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Dockets: WC 18-89, ET 21-232, and EA 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The newly identified UAS approvals run through December 31, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The notice’s Covered List identifies the foreign-produced UAS category as added December 22, 2025, with updates on January 7, March 18, and May 26, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Router approvals listed in Appendix B extend into 2027, including Netgear approvals through October 1, 2027, and other approvals through October 31, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Conditional Approvals - Nokia</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-drone-conditional-approvals-1e5ef7/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-drone-conditional-approvals-1e5ef7/</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 18 May 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) updates the FCC Covered List to exclude specified routers that received Department of War (DoW) Conditional Approvals, including Nokia Corporation’s Beacons, Open Network Terminal (ONT) Based Beacons, and Fastmile Gateway routers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; PSHSB finds that the Conditional Approvals are “a specific determination” that the identified devices do not pose risks to U.S. national security and therefore concludes that it must update and maintain the Covered List to exclude them. The notice publishes the updated Covered List and a separate list of Conditional Approvals. The router approvals cover products from Netgear, Adtran, eero/Amazon Leo, Calix, and Nokia; the appendices also list Conditional Approvals for specified uncrewed aircraft systems and related equipment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly affects manufacturers and suppliers of the approved routers and UAS products, equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and telecommunications certification bodies. Nokia’s newly listed approvals cover its Beacons, ONT-based Beacons, and Fastmile Gateway routers. The Covered List’s restrictions continue to apply to covered categories and named entities outside the stated exemptions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice illustrates how Executive Branch national-security determinations and Conditional Approvals alter the scope of the FCC Covered List. Foreign-produced routers remain listed categorically unless granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or the Department of Homeland Security, while PSHSB provides staff guidance to TCBs, test labs, and applicants on the updates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released May 18, 2026; DA 26-495 (the document footer identifies DA 26-489).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Router approvals for Nokia’s Beacons, ONT-based Beacons, and Fastmile Gateway routers run through October 31, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The foreign-produced-router category was added to the Covered List on March 23, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant proceedings: WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, and EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Zayo - Team Telecom Mitigation Agreement</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-19-tt25-016-to-017-zayo-crown-castle-loa-executable-3147db/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-19-tt25-016-to-017-zayo-crown-castle-loa-executable-3147db/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Letter of Agreement conditions FCC approval of the proposed transfer of control of certain Crown Castle Operating Company subsidiaries to Fiber FinCo, LLC on extensive national-security and law-enforcement safeguards.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; This LOA, submitted by Front Range Intermediate, Inc. (Zayo Parent), Fiber FinCo, and their FCC-authorized subsidiaries, replaces the parties’ January 21, 2020 LOA upon the date of FCC approval. It requires a U.S.-based law-enforcement point of contact and security officer; personnel screening; controls on foreign-person access; compliance with lawful U.S. process and CALEA; U.S. handling of responsive records; cybersecurity and system-security plans; advance review of principal equipment, service providers, storage locations, access countries, and network operations centers; incident reporting; annual compliance reports; site visits; and possible third-party audits. The Committee and the DOJ, Department of War, and DHS serve as compliance-monitoring agencies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The obligations bind Zayo Parent, Fiber FinCo, and the subsidiaries holding Section 214 authorizations, as well as their personnel, contractors, service providers, equipment vendors, and successors. The agreement also governs access to U.S. records, domestic communications infrastructure, lawful U.S. process, and principal telecommunications equipment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The LOA makes Team Telecom mitigation enforceable through ongoing disclosure, monitoring, and approval mechanisms. It also links telecommunications authorization to supply-chain and foreign-access controls, including reporting involving providers on the FCC Covered List or Commerce Entity List. Breach or unresolved risk can support FCC action to modify, condition, revoke, cancel, or nullify relevant authorizations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Dated May 22, 2026; FCC approval is the operative replacement date for the 2020 LOA.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Initial LEPOC, security-officer, foreign-access, equipment, and service-provider submissions are generally due within 15–30 days after FCC approval.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Cybersecurity and system-security plans, network maps, and screening policies are generally due within 60 days.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Known or suspected security incidents must be reported within 72 hours.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;TT 2025-016 and 017&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Conditional Approvals - Elevon Aerial (drones), Nokia (routers)</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-drone-conditional-approvals-e6b8b3/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-drone-conditional-approvals-e6b8b3/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau announces that Department of War Conditional Approvals require exclusion of specified uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS), UAS critical components, and routers from the FCC Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice updates and republishes the Covered List and the related Conditional Approvals list as of May 15, 2026. It identifies new Conditional Approvals for Elevon Aerial AG’s Z30, Z50, and Z80 UAS, terminating December 31, 2026, and Nokia Corporation’s wireless-fidelity 8 router, terminating October 31, 2027. The appendices also list previously approved UAS and router devices, including products from SiFly, Mobilicom, ScoutDI, Verge, &lt;a href=&quot;http://Sees.ai&quot;&gt;Sees.ai&lt;/a&gt;, Air6, Netgear, Adtran, eero, and Calix.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action affects manufacturers and suppliers of foreign-produced UAS, UAS critical components, and routers, as well as equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and Telecommunications Certification Bodies. Covered List exclusions apply to the specified devices, while the broader categories remain covered subject to stated exceptions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice illustrates how a specific national-security determination by the Department of War can narrow the operational scope of a Covered List category without removing the category itself. PSHSB states that it must maintain and update the list under 47 CFR §§ 1.50002(a) and 1.50003, and offers staff guidance on the updates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released May 15, 2026; DA 26-489.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Dockets: WC 18-89, ET 21-232, and EA 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Elevon approvals terminate December 31, 2026; Nokia approval terminates October 31, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;UAS were added to the Covered List on December 22, 2025; foreign-produced routers were added on March 23, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OET Waivers (UAS and routers) extended to 2029</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-oet-waivers-extended-to-2029-6c94d5/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-oet-waivers-extended-to-2029-6c94d5/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Office of Engineering and Technology extends through at least January 1, 2029, and expands waivers allowing certain already-authorized covered UAS, UAS critical components, and routers to receive consumer-protective software and firmware updates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; OET continues its prior waivers from the prohibitions in 47 CFR §§ 2.932(b) and 2.1043(b) for Class I permissive changes involving software and firmware updates that mitigate harm to U.S. consumers. The extension applies to covered UAS and UAS critical components authorized before their December 22, 2025, Covered List addition, and covered routers authorized before their March 23, 2026, addition. It also adds analogous relief for Class II permissive changes. Covered updates include patches for vulnerabilities, continued device functionality, and operating-system compatibility. The waiver does not remove other FCC filing, testing, performance, marketing, or certification requirements.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; Manufacturers and grantees of already-authorized foreign-produced UAS, UAS critical components, and routers covered by the FCC rules may continue qualifying updates. It does not authorize new covered equipment or changes beyond the specified Class I and Class II software and firmware updates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; Without relief, the revised equipment-authorization rules could block security and safety updates for devices added to the Covered List. OET finds that extending the limited waiver serves the public interest while allowing the Commission to consider codifying the policy through rulemaking.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;May 8, 2026: waiver extension and expansion released; DA 26-454.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;January 1, 2029: waiver period extends at least through this date.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;December 22, 2025: covered UAS and UAS critical components were added to the Covered List.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 23, 2026: covered routers were added to the Covered List.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;ET Docket No. 21-232; governing provisions include 47 CFR §§ 2.932(b) and 2.1043(b).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Conditional Approvals - Air6 (drones), Calix (routers)</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-drone-conditional-approvals-543f2f/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-drone-conditional-approvals-543f2f/</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau announces that specified uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS), UAS critical components, and routers have received Department of War Conditional Approvals and are therefore exempt from the FCC Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice updates the Covered List and its accompanying Conditional Approvals appendix. The newly identified approvals cover Air6 System GmbH’s listed AIR8 and AIR4 UAS and Calix, Inc.’s 7u6.2 router, part number 100-06200. The notice also republishes the broader Covered List and the existing approvals for UAS and routers, including approvals for SiFly, Mobilicom, ScoutDI, Verge, &lt;a href=&quot;http://Sees.ai&quot;&gt;Sees.ai&lt;/a&gt;, Netgear, Adtran, and eero.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action affects manufacturers, suppliers, equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, telecommunications providers, and entities seeking to use or obtain FCC authorizations for covered equipment. Devices produced in foreign countries remain covered unless an applicable exception or Conditional Approval applies; staff guidance remains available to TCBs, test labs, and applicants.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice illustrates how specific executive-branch determinations modify the practical scope of the Covered List without removing the broader categories of foreign-produced UAS, UAS components, or routers. It also provides an official, dated reference for the approval status and expiration periods of named devices.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released May 6, 2026; DA 26-437.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Dockets: WC 18-89, ET 21-232, and EA 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Air6 approval terminates December 31, 2026; Calix approval terminates October 31, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The Covered List’s foreign-produced UAS category was added December 22, 2025; foreign-produced routers were added March 23, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>record</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-09-record-544b29/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-09-record-544b29/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC proposes to exclude entities identified on the Covered List, including their current and future affiliates and subsidiaries, from blanket domestic section 214 authority and seeks comment on related national-security restrictions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The NPRM would amend 47 CFR § 63.01 to prevent Covered List entities from using blanket authority to construct, acquire, operate, or transmit over domestic lines. It asks whether excluded entities should instead file affirmative applications subject to possible Team Telecom review; how to revoke existing blanket authority; whether to impose a transition period; and whether to prohibit interconnection with entities whose authority is denied or revoked. It also seeks comment on extending restrictions to entities owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, dealings with certain entities, and provision of communications services using unlicensed Part 15 equipment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The proposals principally affect Covered List entities and their affiliates and subsidiaries, domestic telecommunications carriers, interconnected providers, customers, and potentially small entities in wired, wireless, reseller, satellite, and other telecommunications industries. The FCC identifies possible compliance, switching, interconnection, and application costs but adopts no final restrictions in this notice.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The proceeding would shift Covered List entities from automatic domestic section 214 entry to case-by-case review, using national-security determinations about covered equipment and services to scrutinize providers’ access to U.S. communications networks. It also explores limits on interconnection and unlicensed wireless operations, potentially broadening the FCC’s adjacent Covered List regime.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Adopted April 30, 2026; released May 1, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Comments are due 30 days after Federal Register publication; replies are due 60 days after publication.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The proposed rule would revise 47 CFR § 63.01(a), under Communications Act sections 1–4, 201, 214, 251, and 301–303.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;A six-month transition period is offered as one possible approach for revoking existing authority, not adopted as a requirement.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Bad Labs 2.0</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-07-fcc-26-28a1-8d5c7b/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-07-fcc-26-28a1-8d5c7b/</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 30 Apr 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC adopts new equipment-authorization integrity rules, grants Garmin’s reconsideration petition in part, and seeks comment on further limits involving non-Reciprocal Economy testing and FCC data systems.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Second Report and Order creates a priority fast-track process for Pre-Approval Guidance applications tested by U.S. or other “Trusted Test Labs” in Reciprocal Economies; requires test labs and TCBs to disclose the number and business location of employees involved in FCC-recognized testing or certification; and directs OET to revise post-market surveillance, strengthen enforcement, establish a confidential reporting channel, and create a consolidated human-readable and, where feasible, machine-readable prohibited-entity list. For U.S. publicly traded companies, the order changes five-percent ownership reporting deadlines to run from actual knowledge of the relevant change. The accompanying Second Further Notice asks about restricting recognition of test labs, TCBs, and accreditation bodies in non-Reciprocal Economies and modernizing the Equipment Authorization System.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The rules directly affect FCC-recognized test laboratories, telecommunications certification bodies, laboratory accreditation bodies, equipment applicants and manufacturers, and entities appearing on incorporated federal security lists. Garmin International, Inc.’s petition is granted to the extent described.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The FCC links domestic and reciprocal-country testing to reduced foreign surveillance and intellectual-property risks, greater accountability, and a more resilient equipment-authorization system. The order also expands transparency and enforcement while leaving broader non-Reciprocal Economy restrictions for further comment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Adopted April 30, 2026; released May 1, 2026; comments are due 30 days and replies 60 days after Federal Register publication.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The FCC reports 39 recognized TCBs, including 23 in the United States, and 23 test labs removed from recognition after the prior order.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;In 2025, OET reviewed about 3,369 PAG applications, including 579 using U.S.-based labs and TCBs.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The estimated annual benefit of fast-track processing is approximately $770,000, against approximately $16,000 in annual reporting costs.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Conditional Approvals - Amazon eero, Amazon Leo (routers)</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-0bb647/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-conditional-approvals-0bb647/</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PSHSB announces that the Department of War’s conditional approval of specified eero and Amazon Leo routers requires their exclusion from the FCC Covered List until October 31, 2027.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; This Public Notice explains the Covered List treatment of foreign-produced routers and records a DoW Conditional Approval for eero LLC’s eero, eero Pro, eero Max, eero PoE, eero Outdoor, eero Signal, and Amazon Leo routers. PSHSB determines that the approval is “a specific determination” that the devices do not pose risks to U.S. national security, and updates the Covered List and related conditional-approval materials accordingly. Appendices A and B provide the updated Covered List and conditional-approval tables.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action directly affects eero LLC and the identified router products, as well as equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and telecommunications certification bodies that rely on the Covered List. It also informs manufacturers of foreign-produced routers that they may seek evaluation by DoW or DHS for a Conditional Approval.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; Foreign-produced routers were added to the Covered List on March 23, 2026, subject to an exception for routers receiving DoW or DHS approval. This notice illustrates how an executive-branch national-security determination changes the scope of the FCC restriction and confirms PSHSB’s role in maintaining and updating the list.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released April 22, 2026; DA 26-390.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Covered List proceedings: WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, and EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Router category added to the Covered List March 23, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;eero/Amazon Leo Conditional Approval runs through October 31, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Updated Covered List and conditional-approval tables appear in Appendices A and B.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Conditional Approvals - Netgear, Adtran (routers), Sees.ai (drone)</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-drone-conditional-approvals-8b2ebb/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-drone-conditional-approvals-8b2ebb/</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 14 Apr 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) updates the Covered List to exempt specified routers and uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components covered by Department of War (DoW) Conditional Approvals.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; PSHSB finds that the listed Conditional Approvals are “a specific determination” that the identified devices do not pose unacceptable risks to U.S. national security, and therefore removes those devices from the Covered List. The April 14, 2026 approvals cover &lt;a href=&quot;http://Sees.ai&quot;&gt;Sees.ai&lt;/a&gt;’s v.USA. 1.0 UAS; Netgear, Inc.’s identified Nighthawk, Orbi, cable gateway, and cable modem series; and Adtran Inc.’s Service Delivery Gateway class routers. The appended approval table also records earlier approvals for SiFly Aviation, Mobilicom, ScoutDI, and Verge UAS products.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The update affects manufacturers and suppliers of the identified foreign-produced routers, UAS, and UAS critical components, as well as equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and telecommunications certification bodies. It also guides FCC staff and regulated parties applying the Covered List rules.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice demonstrates how Executive Branch national-security determinations and DoW or DHS Conditional Approvals alter the scope of the FCC Covered List. It provides a limited exemption rather than a general authorization for foreign-produced routers or UAS, and makes the exemptions time-limited.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released April 14, 2026; DA 26-351.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant proceedings: WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, and EA Docket No. 21-233.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://Sees.ai&quot;&gt;Sees.ai&lt;/a&gt; UAS approval terminates December 31, 2026; Netgear and Adtran approvals terminate October 1, 2027.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The Covered List was updated for foreign-produced routers on March 23, 2026, and for certain UAS approvals on March 18, 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Digitalsystem: Team Telecom Recommendation to Deny Section 214</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-20-public-digitalsystem-fcc-denial-rec-db-ccc7b3/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-20-public-digitalsystem-fcc-denial-rec-db-ccc7b3/</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Services Sector recommends that the FCC deny Digitalsystem Technology Inc.’s application for international Section 214 authority because the national-security and law-enforcement risks presented by the proposed operations cannot be adequately mitigated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The recommendation evaluates Digitalsystem’s request for facilities-based and resold international telecommunications authority under Section 214. It identifies risks associated with PRC and Hong Kong jurisdiction, Digitalsystem’s ownership and affiliates, planned or potential relationships with foreign telecommunications providers, access to U.S. records and systems, data storage, network control, and lawful-intercept capabilities. It also concludes that Digitalsystem’s conflicting, incomplete, and allegedly misleading responses undermine its reliability as a mitigation partner.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The immediate subjects are Digitalsystem, its owners Hui Xie and Yi Zhou, its international affiliates, and the FCC, which must decide the application. The analysis also concerns U.S. telecommunications customers, communications data, law-enforcement process, and providers or partners connected to the PRC or Hong Kong.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The Committee says exploitation could enable collection or exfiltration of communications and sensitive records, disruption of U.S. communications, misrouting of traffic through jurisdictions of concern, and exposure of lawful U.S. investigative information. The recommendation illustrates the Executive Branch’s Team Telecom review of foreign participation in Section 214 licensing and its reliance on candor and mitigation feasibility.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 26, 2024: Digitalsystem filed its FCC application.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;June 14, 2024: The FCC referred the application to the Committee.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;June 30, 2025: The Committee certified the triage responses complete, beginning the 120-day initial review period.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;December 10, 2025: The Committee determined that a secondary assessment was warranted.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;February 23, 2026: The Committee notified its Advisors of the proposed denial, beginning their 21-day opposition period.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;April 1, 2026: The recommendation was signed and submitted.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PN Seeking Comment on pre-2024 Covered List Limitation</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-pn-seeking-comment-on-pre-2024-covered-list-limi-6bf8f8/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-pn-seeking-comment-on-pre-2024-covered-list-limi-6bf8f8/</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s PSHSB and OET propose limiting existing equipment authorizations to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of communications equipment added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier, while preserving the use and operation of equipment already purchased.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; This Public Notice initiates a comment proceeding on applying the authority established in the FCC’s 2025 Equipment Authorization Security Second Report and Order. The proposed limitation would cover equipment authorized before the FCC’s 2022 rules and added to the Covered List by 2024, but not equipment added in 2025 or later. The agencies seek comment on national-security, economic, supply-chain, use-based, and other public-interest considerations. They also propose requiring parties to cease importation and marketing within 30 days after any prohibition becomes effective.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The proposal would affect manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers, communications providers, consumers, government partners, and holders of existing equipment authorizations. It would not revoke those authorizations or prohibit continued operation of devices already in users’ hands.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The proceeding could extend the Covered List regime from blocking new equipment authorizations to restricting the commercial supply of previously authorized equipment. The agencies tentatively find that national-security benefits outweigh economic and supply-chain concerns, noting that Kaspersky-related equipment is already subject to Commerce restrictions and that older covered equipment has not received new authorization since November 11, 2022.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Released March 27, 2026; comments are due 30 days after Federal Register publication.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Proposed scope: Covered List additions in 2024 or earlier, authorized before the 2022 rules.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Proposed cessation period: 30 days after the prohibition’s effective date.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Proceeding: PS Docket No. 26-72; DA 26-294.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Router Permissive Change Waiver</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-permissive-change-waiver-3df6e9/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-permissive-change-waiver-3df6e9/</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 23 Mar 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) temporarily waives prohibitions on certain Class I permissive changes for covered routers authorized before the March 23, 2026, Covered List addition, allowing specified software and firmware updates through March 1, 2027.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; OET waives the application of 47 CFR §§ 2.932(b) and 2.1043(b) to software and firmware updates for previously authorized routers that mitigate harm to U.S. consumers. Covered updates include patches for vulnerabilities, updates needed to maintain device functionality, and changes facilitating compatibility with different operating systems. The waiver applies to routers produced in a foreign country that were authorized before their addition to the Covered List, and OET will reevaluate whether to extend it before the expiration date.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The relief applies to all covered routers authorized for use in the United States before March 23, 2026, including consumer-grade networking devices within the document’s cited definition. It affects manufacturers and other parties responsible for maintaining those devices, while preserving the underlying Covered List and equipment-authorization restrictions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; Without the waiver, the revised certification rules would bar even Class I permissive changes to previously authorized routers once they became covered equipment. The temporary exception allows security and safety updates to continue while the Commission considers how its October 2025 rule revisions apply to the new router designation. OET grounds the waiver in special circumstances and the public interest.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 23, 2026: Routers were added to the Covered List and the waiver was released.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 1, 2027: Waiver expiration and target date for OET reevaluation.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;47 CFR §§ 2.932(b), 2.1043(b): Rules whose prohibitions are waived for the specified updates.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;DA 26-286; ET Docket No. 21-232: Document identifiers.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Router Covered List</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-covered-list-8cb970/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-router-covered-list-8cb970/</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 23 Mar 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau adds routers produced in a foreign country to the FCC Covered List, subject to Conditional Approvals from the Department of War (DoW) or Department of Homeland Security (DHS).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; The Public Notice adopts a National Security Determination received by the FCC on March 20, 2026, finding that foreign-produced routers pose unacceptable risks involving supply-chain vulnerabilities and severe cybersecurity threats. The Covered List entry is: “Routers produced in a foreign country, except routers which have been granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS.” The notice explains that production generally includes major stages such as manufacturing, assembly, design, and development. It also provides submission guidance for Conditional Approvals, which may last up to 18 months and require corporate, supply-chain, and U.S. manufacturing information.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The action applies regardless of the producer’s nationality to entities producing routers abroad, equipment-authorization applicants, test laboratories, and telecommunications equipment manufacturers. Covered equipment may not receive FCC equipment authorization, and applicants must certify that equipment is not prohibited as covered equipment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Definition of router&lt;/strong&gt; &amp;quot;Routers: For the purpose of this determination, the term “Routers” is defined by [NIST] Internal Report 8425A to include consumer-grade networking devices that are primarily intended for residential use and can be installed by the customer. Routers forward data packets, most commonly Internet Protocol (IP) packets, between networked systems.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The action extends the Covered List from identified entities and other equipment categories to a place-of-production category. It is intended to address risks associated with compromised routers, including network surveillance, data exfiltration, botnets, unauthorized access, and disruption of critical infrastructure, while providing a DoW/DHS exemption pathway.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 20, 2026: National Security Determination received and Conditional Approval guidance dated.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 23, 2026: Public Notice released and router category included on the Covered List.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Conditional Approvals may be granted for up to 18 months.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Relevant authorities include 47 U.S.C. § 1601 and 47 CFR §§ 1.50002, 1.50003, 2.903, and 2.911.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Conditional Approvals - SiFly Aviation, Mobilicom, ScoutDI, Verge (drones)</title>
      <link>https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-uas-first-conditional-approvals-7ef9ff/</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://natsecnoir.com/records/2026-09-04-uas-first-conditional-approvals-7ef9ff/</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Mar 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau announces that four specified UAS or UAS-related product sets received Department of War conditional approvals and are therefore excluded from the FCC Covered List through December 31, 2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What it does&lt;/strong&gt; This Public Notice updates the Covered List’s UAS entry under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act and sections 1.50002(a) and 1.50003 of the FCC’s rules. It recognizes DoW’s individual determinations as “specific determination[s]” that the identified devices do not pose risks to U.S. national security, and publishes the revised list in Appendix A and the approved devices in Appendix B. The revised UAS entry also retains exclusions for items on the DCMA Blue UAS Cleared List and qualifying domestic end products, each until January 1, 2027.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Who it affects&lt;/strong&gt; The conditional approvals cover SiFly Aviation’s Q12 UAS; Mobilicom’s SkyHopper Series, M Band, Tactical Data Link, various controllers, and ICE/OS3 Security Software; ScoutDI’s Scout 137 UAS; and Verge’s X1 UAS. They also affect equipment authorization applicants, testing laboratories, and telecommunications certification bodies that rely on the Covered List.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters&lt;/strong&gt; The notice creates a targeted path out of the UAS Covered List while preserving the broader inclusion of foreign-produced UAS and critical components. The approvals are time-limited, so the listed devices remain exempt only through the end of 2026 unless further action occurs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key dates and numbers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 18, 2026: Notice released and Covered List updated.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;March 17–December 31, 2026: Conditional-approval period for each listed device or product set.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;January 1, 2027: Existing Blue UAS and domestic-end-product exclusions expire.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;December 22, 2025: Foreign-produced UAS and critical components were initially added to the Covered List.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Four entities received conditional approvals:&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;SiFly Aviation’s Q12 UAS;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Mobilicom’s SkyHopper Series, M Band, Tactical Data Link, various controllers, and ICE/OS3 Security Software;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;ScoutDI’s Scout 137 UAS;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Verge’s X1 UAS.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
    </item>
  </channel>
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